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Use of expert knowledge to anticipate the future: Issues, analysis and 
directions 
 
Fergus Bolger and George Wright 
 
Abstract 
 
Unless the anticipation problem is routine and short-term, and objective data are plentiful, 
expert judgment will be needed. Risk assessment is analogous to anticipation of the future 
in that models need to be developed and applied to data. Since objective data are often 
scanty, expert knowledge elicitation (EKE) techniques have been developed for risk 
assessment that allow model development and parametrization using expert judgments 
with minimal cognitive and social biases. Here, we conceptualize how EKE can be developed 
and applied to support anticipation of the future. Accordingly, we first define EKE as an 
entire process, that involves considering experts as a source of data, and that comprises 
various methods for ensuring the quality of this data, including  W selecting the best experts, 
training experts in normative aspects of anticipation, and combining judgments of several 
experts  W as well as eliciting unbiased estimates and constructs from experts. We detail 
aspects of the papers that constitute the Special Issue and analyse these in terms of the 
stages within the EKE future-anticipation process that they address. We identify the 
remaining gaps in our knowledge. Our conceptualization of EKE to support anticipation of 
the future is compared and contrasted with the extant research effort into judgmental 
forecasting. 
 
Introduction 
 
Broadly speaking, anticipating the future is about applying some model of the world (that 
connects the past and the present to the future) to a set of data to produce predictions 
regarding the future state of the world; these data can be either quantitative or qualitative, 
similarly models too can be quantitative or qualitative (e.g. statistical time-series versus 
causal models).  An important part of anticipation is the assessment of uncertainty 
regarding predictions because decision makers and planners need to know, for instance, 
how much resource to allocate to particular eventualities, or to reducing uncertainty by 
collecting more data. Models, data and uncertainty all lie on continua between subjective 
and objective. 
 
Psychologists and decision scientists have catalogued a number of potential weaknesses in 
human judgment and decision making that apply to experts and laypeople alike. These 
weaknesses include the use of mental shortcuts or heuristics that can result in biases in both 
predictions and assessments of uncertainty surrounding those predictions (e.g. Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1974; Kahneman & Tversky, 1984). All stages of the anticipation process require 
some input from humans  W to a greater or lesser extent  W preferably from those with some 
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relevant expertise. For example, experts must recognize the need to make predictions, 
describe the problem, formulate a model, identify and search for data, chose an appropriate 
method to make a model operational (e.g., a particular time-series method or a particular 
scenario development method), apply the method to make predictions (involving 
integration of information from different sources), assess uncertainty, and evaluate the 
whole anticipation process and its outcomes. There is therefore ample opportunity for error 
and bias to affect the quality of anticipation of the future at each stage (see e.g. Bolger and 
Harvey, 1998).  
 
One area that has seen quite a large amount of attention in recent years is the development 
of methods to elicit estimates of parameters of risk assessment models from experts as 
applied, for instance, to hazards from earthquakes, volcanoes, climate change and threats 
to the food supply (Aspinall, 2010; Bolger et al., 2014; Budnitz et al., 1997; US EPA, 2009; 
Reilly et al., 2010). These elicitation methods applied to risk analysis have come to be known 
ĂƐ “ĞǆƉĞƌƚŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞĞůŝĐŝƚĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?< ?ƚĞĐŚŶŝƋƵĞƐ. 
 
What is EKE? 
 
EKE is an emerging field and, as such is not yet well defined. As we have just indicated, the 
ƚĞƌŵ “< ?ŚĂƐƐŽĨĂƌƵƐƵĂůůy been applied in quite a narrow sense to elicitation methods 
applied to risk analysis: these methods are chiefly concerned with eliciting estimates of 
uncertain quantities1, usually in the form of probability distributions  ?ƐĞĞ ?Ğ ?Ő ? ?K ?,ĂŐĂŶĞƚ
al., 2006), from groups of experts: several of the papers in this Special Issue define EKE in 
these terms. It is important to stress, however, that EKE is not a single method, or even a 
methodology, but an approach that encompasses, but is not restricted to, several extant 
modelling approaches and their linked methods, some of which we will describe later. As an 
approach, EKE has some defining characteristics that we will now discuss in turn: this 
analysis permits a broadening of the definition of EKE so that it is more applicable to the 
range of uses of expert knowledge for anticipation. 
 
Foremost of these general characteristics, EKE is a practical enterprise that applies the 
findings of social science research to the problem of extracting the best possible estimates 
from people in the face of lack of hard evidence, and with the presence of uncertainty, to be 
used for specific purposes (e.g. risk analysis, decision and policy making, and, indeed, 
anticipation of the future). Related to this, several presentations of EKE (e.g., Bolger et al, 
2014; Budnitz et al, 1997; Cooke & Goossens, 2008; Knol et al., 2010) take the form of 
guidelines or protocols that embrace the entire process of eliciting judgments for the given 
purpose, even if some parts of this process have received more attention (in terms of both 
fundamental research and practical implementations) than others. We organize the 
following discussion of common principles and features of EKE by where they fit into this 
overall process. 
                                                          
1 EKE, as defined here, should not be confused with knowledge elicitation for expert systems. The latter 
requires expert knowledge and/or judgment processes to be verbalizable, while the former simply requires 
verbalization of the end-product of such knowledge and processes, which  psychological research suggests that 
experts often do not have access to (e.g. Berry & Broadbent, 1984; Nisbett & Wilson, 1977),  perhaps because 
their expertise derives from very many exemplars or instances acquired through experience (e.g. Shanks, 
1997). 
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The EKE process as applied to anticipation 
 
Since our current concern is to extend EKE to problems of anticipation we have decided to 
ƵƐĞƌŵƐƚƌŽŶŐ ?Ɛ(1985) stages of the forecasting process  W which can be applied to 
anticipating the future more generally  W as a template, rather than any of the 
characterizations of the EKE process created for other purposes ?ƌŵƐƚƌŽŶŐ ?ƐĨŝƌƐƚƐƚĂŐĞ is 
ǁŚĂƚŚĞƌĞĨĞƌƐƚŽĂƐ “/ŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?ǁŚĞƌĞƚŚĞĂŶƚŝĐŝƉĂƚŝŽŶƉƌŽďůĞŵŝs formulated and 
defined (i.e. a model is created and sources of relevant data are identified). Second, a 
particular method is chosen to apply the identified model to the data in order to produce 
predictions, and/or to gather judgment data relevant to important parameters of the 
model. The third stage is the application of the chosen method to anticipate the future: if 
more than one anticipator (person or machine) is involved then there may be comparison, 
combination and adjustment of predictions in the light of other predictions at this stage. 
Also it is at this stage where uncertainty is usually assessed, although it has been argued 
that it should be assessed from the outset as part of problem formulation (Knol et al. 2010). 
Finally, at the fourth stage, the success of the anticipation process and outcomes may be 
evaluated and documented. Next, we expand discussion of these stages and document the 
connections between our Special Issue papers and particular stages. 
 
Stage 1: Implementation 
 
This initial stage, where the need for foresight is recognised (i.e., there is recognition that 
the future may not be an exact replica of the past), a model formulated, relevant variables 
identified, and data search initiated has received relatively little attention in EKE applied to 
risk analysis, with most work in effect starting with a defined problem and the specific need 
for a particular type of (expert) judgement pre-identified. In contrast, model-building is 
integral to Scenario Planning and there has also been some work concerned with monitoring 
and detection, see below. 
 
a). Monitoring and detection (of indicators of an emerging future) 
 
Following from a couple of papers by Paul Schoemaker (Schoemaker & Day, 2009; 
Schoemaker et al., 2013), one of the founding fathers of Scenario Planning, there has been 
an interest in looking for so-ĐĂůůĞĚ “ǁĞĂŬƐŝŐŶĂůƐ ?ǁŚŝĐŚĂƌĞƉŝĞĐĞƐŽĨŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚ ?ŝŶ
themselves, appear as just noise but are indicators of significant future events or trends 
when seen in the context of other information, or looked at differently. This idea has been 
taken-up by both the private and public sectors in the UK who have begun long-term 
ŵŽŶŝƚŽƌŝŶŐŽƌ “ŚŽƌŝǌŽŶ-ƐĐĂŶŶŝŶŐ ?ĚĞĨŝŶĞĚĂƐ P
  
 “A systematic examination of information to identify potential threats, risks, emerging 
issues and opportunities Qallowing for better preparedness and the incorporation of 
mitigation and exploitation into the policy making process. ? ?ĂǇ ? ? ? ? ?, p. 2). 
 
Meissner et al. (this issue [1]) propose a new method for horizon scanning that they call 
 “ ? ? ?o ^ƚĂŬĞŚŽůĚĞƌ&ĞĞĚďĂĐŬ ?ƚŚĂƚĂƚƚĞŵƉƚƐƚŽƌĞĚƵĐĞďŝĂƐĂƌŝƐŝŶŐĨƌŽŵĂŶĞǆĐĞƐƐŝǀĞŝŶƚĞƌŶĂů
focus, which ĐĂŶůĞĂĚƚŽ “ďůŝŶĚƐƉŽƚƐ ?ŝŶĨŽƌĞƐŝŐŚƚ ?ďǇĞůŝĐŝƚŝŶŐƚŚĞũƵĚŐŵĞŶƚƐŽĨĞǆƚĞƌŶĂů
Eliciting expert knowledge for anticipation 
5 
 
stakeholders as well as organization insiders. Derbyshire and Wright (this issue [2] also 
criticize horizon-scanning, as it is currently practiced, as being over-simplistic  - since it is 
based on the identification of a single type of cause and there is therefore, implicitly, a 
simple causal chain of unfolding events leading to a particular outcome. They propose, as a 
frame-broadening solution, a more thorough description of the present, plus consideration 
of additional types of causes. 
 
b). Problem perceptions, and the development and documentation of mental models 
 
There seems potential here to use methods for capturing more qualitative aspects of expert 
knowledge (e.g. arguments, classifications, and perceived causal relations) for model 
development. Tools available for this include influence diagrams (e.g. Howard, 1989; Oliver 
& Smith, 1990); cognitive maps (e.g. Eden, 1988); card sorts and repertory grids (e.g. Bolger 
et al., 1989), or ƐŝŵƉůǇ “ďƌĂŝŶƐƚŽƌŵŝŶŐ ? (e.g. Rowe & Bolger, in press used brainstorming as 
the first round of a Delphi process, in order to identify those precursor factors seen as 
fundamental to the prediction problem). All these approaches are concerned with ways in 
which to elicit and document individual and group-based perceptions. The Delphi approach, 
especially, facilitates challenge and subsequent change in perceptions or viewpoints  W 
allowing the in-group evaluation of individual frames (see Bolger and Wright, 2013)2.  
 
Scenario Planning facilitates the modelling of perceptions and viewpoints and provides a 
documentation of this. For example, Derbyshire and Wright (this issue [2]) show how the 
Intuitive Logics (IL) approach can be used to identify an issue of concern - around which 
anticipations of the future are subsequently developed using predetermined elements,  
critical uncertainties, and perceived causal relationships between both. These authors 
propose to improve on IL with a more thorough description of the present, plus 
consideration of additional causes and a new focus on transformational change and causal 
loops. Further, Meissner et al. (this issue [1]) use brainstorming within a Delphi-like process 
which is nested within a Scenario Planning framework to uncover potential influences on 
the future development of ĂŶŽƌŐĂŶŝǌĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƐďƵƐŝŶĞƐƐĞŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞnt. 
 
Rich qualitative expert knowledge can also be elicited in a traditional Delphi process in the 
form of supporting arguments or rationales for quantitative judgments: we (Bolger & 
Wright, 2011) have argued that feedback of rationales  W in other words, the particular 
models underpinning anticipations of the future  W is key to opinion change for the better in 
Delphi. In the IDEA protocol outlined by Hanea et al. (this issue [3]), although there is no 
explicit model development, experts can research a given problem for a couple of weeks 
individually before submitting their predictions  W and uncertainty assessments  W and 
justifications thereof. The problem is then reassessed on receipt of feedback (aggregated by 
                                                          
2 With respect to the distinction made in the previous footnote, these methods require knowledge (and 
sometimes reasoning processes) to be verbalizable; thus there is a potential limit to their effectiveness. 
However, there is some reason to believe that by no means all expert knowledge and processes are exemplar-
based and thus inaccessible to them (see, e.g., Karlsson,  Juslin & Olsson, 2008). Further research is needed to 
determine the conditions under which eliciting this more qualitative expertise is useful for improving judgment 
quality, and when it is not. 
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a facilitator) regarding oƚŚĞƌƐ ?ũƵĚŐŵĞŶƚƐĂŶĚrationales: these rationales can potentially 
allow participants to build a joint (implicit) model of the problem. 
 
c). Identify data and experts 
 
Once the model has been developed it should be clearer what sort of data are needed (e.g. 
what parameters in the model need instantiating): initial data search and collection can 
begin. It should also become apparent at this stage whether input from additional experts3 
will be required and thus a need for EKE identified: note that experts can be considered as 
data sources as well as potential contributors to modelling and uncertainty assessment. This 
brings us to the second defining feature of EKE which is its concern with identifying and 
measuring expertise.  In some cases it will be clear at this stage who the relevant experts 
are or, at least, what the potential pool of experts is. In most cases, though, the selection of 
experts is bound up with further analysis of the problem, and the choice of methods. For 
this reason we will defer further consideration of expert selection until later.  
 
Stage 2: Choice of Method 
 
This Stage can be seen as a further refinement of Stage 1 on the basis of data requirements 
identified there. In particular, characteristics of tasks, experts, and methods must be 
matched to each other. Although we will treat this here in a linear fashion, it is really an 
iterative process of examining characteristics of task, experts and method to establish the 
best fit. 
 
a).  Task analysis.  
 
Perhaps the most important feature of foresight tasks relevant to both the selection of data 
and methods is how far ahead we want to anticipate. It is clear that the longer the 
anticipation horizon, the harder it is to predict what will happen. The longer the horizon for 
anticipation, then, the less we can rely on data sets of previously-collected data on the 
forecast variable and the more we will need to use expert judgment to synthesise 
qualitative and quantitative information to aid prediction or anticipation.  
 
Uncertainty will also increase with time horizon, hence the need to explicitly represent this 
uncertainty will also increase. In short-range forecasting with good historical data and stable 
environments there is neither need for expert judgment  W beyond searching for data and 
choosing the method  W nor judgment of uncertainty (estimates of uncertainty can be made 
from statistical analysis of the data e.g. its variability). However, such conditions will rarely 
pertain in practice  W the horizon will be long, or data will be scanty, or the environment will 
be changing, or any combination of these things  W expert judgement will be required and 
some of which will be judgement of uncertainty.  Thus how best to represent uncertainty 
and elicit it from experts is a central concern of EKE, reflected in several of the papers in 
this Special Issue.  
 
                                                          
3We presume that there are already an expert or experts in the foresight problem involved. 
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Once expert judgement is involved it is not simply the case that all tasks are equal with 
regard to uncertainty assessment. Bolger and Wright (1994) proposed that the quality of 
uncertainty judgement (i.e. its reliability and validity) depends to a large degree on the 
 “learnability ?ŽĨƚŚĞũƵĚŐĞŵĞŶƚƚĂƐŬ ?ƚŚĂƚŝƐ ?ƚŚĞĞǆƚĞŶƚƚŽǁŚŝĐĞǆƉĞƌƚƐĐĂŶůĞĂƌŶƚŽŵĂŬĞ
reliable and valid assessments of the uncertainty surrounding judgments of target variables. 
ŽůŐĞƌĂŶĚtƌŝŐŚƚĂůƐŽƉƌŽƉŽƐĞƚŚĂƚƚĂƐŬƐŵƵƐƚďĞ “ecologically valid ? ?ŵĞĂŶŝŶŐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǇ
correspond to the professional ecology of the experts --  ƚŚƵƐƚŚĞĞǆƉĞƌƚƐ ?ĂĐƋƵŝƌĞĚ
experience is valid for that task  W and can lead to elevated performance. In many studies of 
expert judgment the tasks are not ecologically valid. 
 
While the foresight horizon influences the type of model that we might use  W and thence 
the kind of data  W the availability of good quality objective data may also independently 
impact upon the type of model. Thus if there is little or no relevant historic data (e.g. when 
forecasting the demand for a new technological product) one may be forced to rely on 
models that have a predominantly judgemental character, even if the horizon is short.   
 
In Meissner et al. (this issue [1]) experts generate then rate factors potentially affecting the 
construction industry in the future (i.e. quantitative and qualitative data are elicited). The 
uncertainty analysis proposed here is not an input to the anticipation model, as is usually 
the case, ďƵƚĂƉƉůŝĞĚƚŽƚŚĞŵŽĚĞů ?Ɛ output PǁĞĂŬƐŝŐŶĂůƐĂŶĚĨŽƌĞƐŝŐŚƚ “ďůŝŶĚ ƐƉŽƚƐ ?ĂƌĞ
identified through examination of the factors generated, and their ratings. DĞŝƐƐŶĞƌĞƚĂů ?Ɛ
approach is not typical of Scenario Planning, where uncertainty is not usually quantified as a 
numerical assessment. In Derbyshire and Wright (this issue [2]) uncertainty is represented 
by the complexity of the causal model(s) developed. In their approach, greater complexity is 
permitted relative to IL by virtue of additional types of cause (formal, material and final) and 
causal loops. However, Derbyshire and Wright claim that uncertainty may be reduced by 
more detailed analysis of predetermined elements of the future. 
 
Hanea et al. (this issue [3]) do not analyse the characteristics of their task (geopolitical 
forecasting) or data in detail, however, it is noted that the method requires relatively short-
term forecasts because actual realizations are needed in order to measure performance for 
expert selection and weighting. Further, certain specifics of the method  W for example, the 
elicitation technique, and performance measures  W require judgments of likelihood of 
dichotomous events. Wilson (this issue [7]) analyses judgments for tasks drawn from the 
ĞůĨƚĚĂƚĂďĂƐĞŽĨƐƚƵĚŝĞƐƵƐŝŶŐŽŽŬĞ ?ƐŵĞƚŚŽĚ (Cooke, 1991), which, ?ůŝŬĞ,ĂŶĞĂĞƚĂů ?Ɛ
IDEA, needs realizations of earlier predictions to select and weight experts: in this case for 
ĞĂƌůŝĞƌĨŽƌĞĐĂƐƚƐƚŚĂƚĂƌĞƐŝŵŝůĂƌƚŽƚŚĞƚĂƌŐĞƚ ?ŬŶŽǁŶĂƐ “seed questions ? ? ?tŝůƐŽŶƵƐĞƐƚŚĞ
ĞǆƉĞƌƚƐ ?ƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĂŶĐĞŽŶƚŚĞƐĞĞĚƐƚŽŝŶǀĞƐƚŝŐĂƚĞĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝƐƚŝĐƐŽĨĞǆƉĞƌƚƐĂŶĚƚĂƐŬƐ ?ŝŶ
particular dependencies between experts and/or items). The quantity and quality of seeds 
(in particular the closeness of the epistemic relationship of seeds with the target  W see e.g. 
Bolger & Rowe, 2015a,b) have implications for choice of both experts and aggregation 
method (see below). Note that Wilson suggests that short-term forecasts could be used as 
seed for long(er)-term forecasting 
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Uncertainty is present in the time-series extrapolation task used by Onkal et al. (this issue 
[4]) as 90% confidence intervals in the advice. However, the advisor ?Ɛ track record for 
forecasting was available to some: the advisors were artificial experts with either high or 
low forecast error), which reduces uncertainty. In practice, though, we will usually have little 
or no objective data regarding the performance of experts  W with the exception of short-
term forecasting tasks, such as weather forecasting, stock market forecasting and weekly 
demand forecasting. Meanwhile, Alvarado et al. (this issue [5]) examine the effects of 
manipulating some task characteristics:  “ŶĞĞĚĨŽƌĐŽƌƌĞĐƚŝŽŶ ? ?ŝ ?Ğ ?ǁŚĞŶƚŚĞƌĞŝƐƌŽŽŵĨŽƌ
improvement on statistical forecasts), and credibility of statistical forecasts (i.e. whether 
they are fair, unbiased, complete, accurate, and trustworthy). The authors examine the 
effects of their manipulations on judgmental extrapolation performance for what is a 
relatively ecologically valid task.  Petropoulous et al. (this issue [6]) also examine judgmental 
extrapolation of time series. Forecasters received rolling feedback about their performance 
(bias or accuracy) and values of realizations: the effects of this feedback on performance 
were examined.  In all three studies the authors used real series containing features such as 
trend and seasonality, which added to ecological validity, but in Onkal et al. and 
Petropoulous et al., but not Alvarado et al. which was a field study, the forecasters had no 
contextual information, so could not use their experience to the full. Note, however, that in 
the latter paper the emphasis was on how people evaluate expertise when presented with 
forecasts  W not on how they use their own inherent expertise to make these forecasts. 
 
b). Expert selection.  
 
At the centre of the EKE approach is the expert. As we already indicated, the expert is a 
source of daƚĂŝŶ<ĂŶĚƚŚĞƌĂŝƐŽŶĚ ?ĞƚƌĞŽĨ<ƉƌŽĐĞĚƵƌĞƐŝƐƚŽŵĂǆŝŵŝǌĞƚŚĞƌĞůŝĂďŝůŝƚǇ
and validity of judgments elicited from experts. As a first step in this goal attention should 
be paid to selecting experts ǁŝƚŚƚŚĞ “ďĞƐƚ ?ŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞŽĨƚŚĞĚŽŵĂŝŶŝŶƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶ: some 
methods for accomplishing this have been suggested (e.g. Bolger & Wentholt, 2014; Meyer 
& Booker, 2001). 
 
Expertise can be regarded as a property of individuals due to extensive practice and/or 
innate characteristics. Some of these might be manifest ŽŶĂŶĞǆƉĞƌƚ ?ƐsĂƐĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐĂŶĚ
professional qualifications; years of professional experience; number of publications, 
patents and citations; prizes and so on.  Another source is peer opinion in the form of 
references or, alternatively, by their responses to a questionnaire such as the Generalized 
Expertise Measure (GEM: Germain & Tejeda, 2012). ůƚŚŽƵŐŚƚŚĞ'D ‘Ɛ ? ?-item scale 
contains objective indicators of expertise (e.g. education, training and qualifications) it also 
contains some more subjective items (e.g. self-assurance, potential for self-improvement 
and intuition).  It should be noted that the reliability and validity of these peer assessments 
is not yet well-established, and that some characteristics that may be associated with 
expertise, such as confidence or self-assuredness, are not necessarily desirable (i.e. it can 
bias both personal judgements and result in the wielding of undue influence in groups). 
 
An important distinction in EKE is between substantive expertise, which is domain or 
content knowledge (usually associated with the notion of expertise in common parlance), 
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and normative expertise, which are agreed methods (e.g. data collection techniques), 
benchmarks (e.g. professional standards) and measures (e.g. expressing uncertainty as 
probabilities). Although in EKE we are usually primarily interested in substantive expertise, 
possession of appropriate normative expertise can also be important, for instance, in aiding 
communication between experts, and between experts and elicitors. Possession of 
normative expertise with respect to probabilities is particularly useful when eliciting 
uncertainty. It is not particularly difficult, however, to train experts in this regard so long as 
they are willing to put in the time (although they often are not): the effectiveness of such 
training for increasing the quality of uncertainty assessment has yet to be established, 
though.  
 
Another way that expert performance is commonly defined is by consensus within a 
particular group. This is sometimes ƌĞĨĞƌƌĞĚƚŽĂƐ “social expertise ?ĂŶĚŵĂǇďĞŵĂŶŝĨĞƐƚ
through status symbols (e.g. titles, honorifics, job role) and a high media profile. Bolger and 
Wentholt (2014) contend that social expertise is a poor proxy for true expertise and propose 
that indicators of social expertise not be used as the sole means for identifying experts: in 
lieu of a bespoke expertise assessment instrument, s ?ƐƐŚŽƵůĚďĞƉƌĞĨĞƌƌĞĚƚŽƉĞĞƌ-
assessment, which in turn should be preferred to self-assessment, which is better than 
social expertise. 
  
Meissner et al. (this issue [1]) utilize a role-based search to find experts internal to the 
organization (managers and others involved in strategic decision-making) and external to it 
(senior personnel in stakeholder organizations). Hanea et al. (this issue [3]) recruit an initial 
convenience sample of volunteers via the internet but in subsequent surveys they 
ƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĞĚƐŽŵĞƐĞůĞĐƚŝŽŶŽŶƚŚĞďĂƐŝƐŽĨƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĂŶĐĞŝŶƚŚĞĨŝƌƐƚǇĞĂƌ ?Ă “^ƵƉĞƌŐƌŽƵƉ ?ǁĂƐ
formed and its performance relative to the other groups was assessed).  In Onkal et al. (this 
issue [4]) expertise (as advice) could be sought by forecasters on basis of either the relevant 
experience or status of the advisor (i.e. social expertise): effects of the basis of expertise on 
advice utilization was investigated as a function of expertise of advisees (novices: 
undergraduate students taking a forecasting course versus ƉƌŽĨĞƐƐŝŽŶĂůƐǁŚŽ “ƌĞŐƵůĂƌůǇ ?
give or receive relevant advice with 7- ? ?ǇĞĂƌƐ ?ĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞ ? ? 
 
Alvarado et al. (this issue [5]) Distinguish between a priori indicators of expertise (e.g. things 
that can be gleaned from a CV or peer assessment i.e. relating to the main objective 
characteristics of experts: specialized domain knowledge, and outstanding and consistent 
performance) and on-task measures (i.e. performance data). In this case the former (role 
and peer assessment via ŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁƐǁŝƚŚĂ “ŬĞǇĐŽŶƚĂĐƚ ?ŝŶƚŚĞŽƌŐĂŶŝǌĂƚŝŽŶand GEM also 
completed by the key contact, respectively) were used to categorize experts, while 
measures of forecasting ability (e.g. APE) were dependent variables. The authors suggest 
that expert knowledge that adds value to statistical forecasts tends to come from people in 
 “ũŽďƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶƐƚŚĂƚĂƌĞŝŶƉĞƌŵĂŶĞŶƚĐŽŶƚĂĐƚǁŝƚŚ QƵŶŵŽĚĞůĞĚĞŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚĂůŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?
zĞĂƌƐ ?ĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞŝŶĐŽŵƉĂŶǇĂŶĚǁŝƚŚƉƌŽĚƵĐƚƐǁĞƌĞĂůƐŽŵĞĂƐƵƌĞĚ ? Finally, while Wilson 
(this issue [7]) does not explicitly address the issue of expert selection, it appears that one 
could potentially pick the experts on basis of patterns of dependency revealed by answers 
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to seed questions (e.g. those who show greatest consistency across answers could be 
included, or given greater weights). 
 
c). Choosing the method. 
 
Here we regard both means of collecting data from experts, and ways of using data from 
any source to anticipate the future, as methods. Thus methods include all EKE and Scenario 
Planning protocols (e.g. CoŽŬĞ ?Ɛmethod, Delphi, IL W to be described shortly), statistical 
forecasting techniques (e.g. time-series decomposition, Box-Jenkins) and pure judgment 
methods (e.g. Charting, time-series extrapolation). Mixtures of judgmental and statistical 
approaches, such as judgmental adjustment of statistical time-series forecasts, we also 
consider as methods4. 
 
Choice of method will depend on the analyses performed above. For example, if plentiful 
good quality data are available for many years in the past, and the prediction horizon is 
short to medium term, then statistical forecasting methods would be indicated as the 
primary method, perhaps with some judgmental adjustment. Alternatively, at the other 
extreme, if predictions are to be made long into the future about events for which there is 
little relevant historical precedent then a more judgmental approach (and thus greater role 
for experts) would be indicated. 
 
Another central characteristic of EKE, that has so far been implicit in our discussion, is that 
knowledge will usually be elicited from more than one expert. Many EKE concerns arise 
from this feature, in particular, there is a preoccupation about how best to aggregate 
ƐĞǀĞƌĂůĞǆƉĞƌƚƐ ?ũƵĚŐŵĞŶƚƐŝŶƚŽĂƐŝŶŐůĞŽŶĞƚŽďĞƵƐĞĚŝŶĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶĂŶĚƉŽůŝĐǇŵĂŬŝŶŐ (as is 
common practice even though there are arguments for not doing so, especially if there is 
disagreement amongst experts, (e.g., Morgan, 2014).  
 
There are three basic approaches to aggregation: behavioural, mathematical, or mixed (a 
combination of the other two).  
 
In behavioural aggregation, experts interact (freely or under the guidance of a facilitator), 
and (hopefully) some consensus will be finally achieved: this consensus forecast or opinion 
is what is then used for policy making. In mathematical aggregation experts make their 
judgements individually and then these are combined into a single forecast by averaging5: 
whether this averaging should be performed using differential or equal weights is hotly 
debated (see e.g. Bolger & Rowe, 2015 a, b and commentaries). Briefly, to differentially 
ǁĞŝŐŚƚŽƉŝŶŝŽŶƌĞƋƵŝƌĞƐĂƐŽƵŶĚďĂƐŝƐĨŽƌǁĞŝŐŚƚŝŶŐ P “ƐŽƵŶĚ ?ďĞĐĂƵƐĞĞƋƵĂůǁĞŝŐŚƚŝŶŐŚĂƐ
been shown to be generally a better bet than using weak or noisy criteria to determine the 
                                                          
4 Methods are not the same as models. In some cases this is obvious, for instance, judgmental extrapolation is 
ĂŵĞƚŚŽĚŽĨĨŽƌĞĐĂƐƚŝŶŐƚŚĂƚ ?ƵŶůĞƐƐƌĂŶĚŽŵ ?ŝƐďĂƐĞĚƵƉŽŶƚŚĞũƵĚŐĞ ?ƐŵĞŶƚĂůŵŽĚĞůƌĞůĂƚŝŶŐƉĂƐƚĂŶĚ
ƉƌĞƐĞŶƚƚŽĨƵƚƵƌĞ ?Ğ ?Ő ? “ƚŽŵŽƌƌŽǁ ?ƐǁĞĂƚŚĞƌŝƐŵŽƐƚůŝŬĞůǇƚŚ ƐĂŵĞĂƐƚŽĚĂǇ ?Ɛ ? ? ?/ŶŽƚŚĞƌĐĂƐĞƐǁĞŵŝŐŚƚĐĂůů
the mental moĚĞůƚŚĞƐĂŵĞŶĂŵĞĂƐƚŚĞĨŽƌŵĂůŵĞƚŚŽĚ ?Ğ ?Ő ? “ĂƌĞŐƌĞƐƐŝŽŶŵŽĚĞů ? ?ďƵƚƚŚŝƐŝƐŵŝƐůĞĂĚŝŶŐ P
although some formal methods specify the form of the relationship between the past/present and future, it is 
not an operational method that makes operational a mental model until it has been parameterized for the 
particular problem under consideration (e.g. predictors identified and betas fitted to them in multiple 
regression). 
5Mathematical aggregation can also be used to combine the judgments of experts with statistical forecasts. 
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weights (e.g., Bolger & Rowe, 2015a, and commentaries; Clemen & Winkler,1999).  Some 
criteria have not been shown to be sound, such as using citations of published work or self-
assessed ability (e.g., Burgman et al., 2011; Cooke et al., 2008) However, proponents of 
CooŬĞ ?Ɛmethod, which uses as the weights ability to answer a set of seed questions  W 
where the true answer is known, and which are related to the target variable to be assessed 
 W provide evidence that this procedure outperforms equal weighting as an aggregation 
procedure (Cooke et al. 2014, Eggstaff et al., 2014). Bolger and Rowe (2015b) dispute this 
evidence and argue that the jury must remain out until further research is conducted.  
 
Statistical aggregation is valuable because it eliminates random noise in judgments but its 
value decreases with each additional expert that is added and with increasing lack of 
independence between the knowledge of different experts: an issue that is discussed by 
Wilson ([7] this issue). Further to this, when experts who have overlapping knowledge get 
together to have a discussion in order to make a decision, they tend to discuss the 
knowledge that they have in common rather than the individual knowledge that each one of 
them can contribute to the group. This may be one reason why group decision making is not 
as effective as it should be (see e.g., Larson, Christensen, Franz & Abbot, 1998; Stasser & 
Titus; 1985, 2006). 
 
Another difference between methods is that in some (e.g. in a Scenario Planning workshop) 
experts meet face to face, wherĞĂƐŝŶŽƚŚĞƌƐ ?Ğ ?Ő ?ĞůƉŚŝŽƌŽŽŬĞ ?ƐŵĞƚŚŽĚ ?they usually do 
not: whether and how experts interact with each other are thus further important concerns 
of EKE. The goal of EKE is to elicit expert knowledge in an unbiased manner as possible, but 
freely interacting groups have been shown to be subject to bias such as Groupthink leading 
ƚŽ “ƉƌŽĐĞƐƐůŽƐƐ ? ?ŝ ?Ğ ?ƚŚĞŝŶƚĞƌĂĐƚŝŽŶƉƌŽĐĞƐƐƉƌŽĚƵĐĞƐƐƵď-optimal outputs relative to non-
interacting, nominal groups (e.g., Rowe & Wright, 1999). On the other hand, the restricted 
information exchange in non-ŝŶƚĞƌĂĐƚŝŶŐŐƌŽƵƉƐŵĞĂŶƐƚŚĂƚ “ƉƌŽĐĞƐƐŐĂŝŶ ? ?ŝ ?Ğ ?ƚŚĞ
advantage to be had by different experts debating and pooling their knowledge) may not be 
as great as it could be.  
 
Behavioural aggregation methods, such as the Sheffield method (KĂŬůĞǇ ?K ?,ĂŐĂŶ ? ? ? ? ?), 
attempt to avoid process loss through careful facilitation following a well-researched 
protocol6. Alternatively, the Delphi method (Linstone & Turoff, 1975) utilizes non-
interacting groups where experts make their judgments individually, these are summarized 
and/or aggregated by facilitators (usually with equal weight given to each expert opinion) 
and fed back to the experts who are invited to revise their original opinions. This procedure 
continues until no significant change in opinions is observed, at which point there is 
generally sufficient consensus to justify putting forward the final aggregated judgment. In 
classic Delphi applied to forecasting, usually only quantitative feedback is given (e.g. 
aggregate point forecasts and confidence in these) but some recommend that reasons for 
judgments are also exchanged in order to facilitate process gain (e.g. Bolger & Wright, 
2011). 
                                                          
6 The Sheffield method is designed for eliciting knowledge from a group of experts in a face-to-face, facilitated 
workshop within which there is a two-stage process beginning with elicitation of individual judgements 
followed by a group discussion. The end result is normally an agreed single probability distribution 
representing the aggregated judgements of the experts. A detailed protocol is given that permits an untrained 
person to act as a facilitator see: http://www.tonyohagan.co.uk/shelf/ 
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Dependency between the knowledge of experts is another issue of interest in the EKE 
ůŝƚĞƌĂƚƵƌĞƚŚĂƚŝƐƌĞůĞǀĂŶƚǁŚĞŶŵƵůƚŝƉůĞĞǆƉĞƌƚƐ ?ũƵĚŐŵĞŶƚƐĂƌĞĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚ ?/ĨƚŚĞƌĞŝƐŚŝŐŚ
homogeneity in expertise then there is little to be gained by sampling multiple experts as 
they will tend to agree, further, many methods of mathematical aggregation assume 
independence between expert judgments (as discussed in this issue [7]) so excessive 
homogeneity can impact on the accuracy of judgment, unless the dependencies are 
accounted for. Consequently methods for introducing heterogeneity into groups of experts 
such as  “Ğǀŝů ?ƐĂĚǀŽĐĂĐǇ ?ĂŶĚ “ĚŝĂůĞĐƚŝĐĂůŝŶƋƵŝƌǇ ?have been proposed (e.g. Bolger & 
Wright, 2014), but if heterogeneity is too great then it can be difficult to reach consensus 
and aggregation may not make sense. 
 
The Special Issue paper that most directly addresses the issue of how to choose the method 
is that of Alvarado et al. (this issue [5]). Here, three integration methods are compared 
(judgmental adjustment, 50-50 and divide-and-conquer) which constitute different ways of 
combining statistical and expert judgment. Results of the study show that judgmental 
adjustment is the best method if both expertise and need-for-correction are high and 
credibility of statistical forecasts is low. However, if situations can be modelled well 
statistically (e.g. where events impacting on the variable to be forecasted are under the 
ĐŽŵƉĂŶǇ ?ƐĐŽŶƚƌŽů ?ƐƵĐŚĂƐƉůĂŶŶĞĚƉƌŽŵŽƚŝŽŶƐ ? the authors suggest that perhaps no EKE is 
needed. 
 
The rest of the papers in the Special Issue focus on only one method, however, several make 
comparisons to other methods thus speak to the issue of method choice. Further, some of 
these methods address aggregation of expert judgment either with other experts, or with 
statistical forecasts. For example, Derbyshire and Wright (this issue [2]) describe the IL 
protocol for Scenario Planning, which is best described as a behavioural aggregation 
method. Experts interact in a workshop and thus exchange rich ideas about causes, trends 
and so forth: this should permit experts to self-weight their contribution to the final model. 
The authors compare this process to a DelphŝǁŚĞƌĞĞǆƉĞƌƚƐ ?ƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůĞƐĂƌĞŐŝǀĞŶĂƐ
feedback. The IDEA EKE method proposed by Hanea et al. (this issue [2]) is something of a 
hybrid between Delphi (iteration and anonymity of final judgments), the Sheffield method 
 ?ƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞĚŝŶƚĞƌĂĐƚŝŽŶďĞƚǁĞĞŶĞǆƉĞƌƚƐŝŶƚŚĞĨŝƌƐƚƌŽƵŶĚ ? ?ĂŶĚŽŽŬĞ ?ƐŵĞƚŚŽĚ
(mathematical aggregation of final-round judgments using performance weights): the 
authors discuss the pros and cons of each approach (and also prediction markets  W 
described below  W which have also been used successfully for the geopolitical forecasting 
discussed by Hanea et al.). 
 
Three of the Special Issue contributions (this issue [1], [4] and [6]) focus on forecasting by 
individuals so it may appear that the issues of aggregation and weighting do not arise. 
However, in the  “ ? ? ?ĚĞŐƌĞĞƐ^ƚĂŬĞŚŽůĚĞƌ&ĞĞĚďĂĐŬ ?ŵĞƚŚŽĚ(this issue [1]) ratings of 
impact and uncertainty are averaged across experts (for clustering analysis which is then fed 
back to the experts), implying equal weighting of expert opinion. Further, behavioural 
aggregation presumably occurs in the final discussions between experts, when the results of 
the exercise are applied to strategy making. Also in Onkal et al. (this issue [4]) advice may be 
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integrated with an individual forecasteƌ ?ƐŽǁŶũƵĚŐŵĞŶƚďĞĨŽƌĞŵĂŬŝŶŐa final forecast. The 
authors of both papers consider how informal aggregation may be biased: in Meissner et al. 
(this issue [1]), their proposed method is designed to reduce the weight placed on the 
judgments of experts internal to the organization by explicitly eliciting the opinions of 
external stakeholders; in Onkal et al. (this issue [4]) experiments show that weights placed 
ŽŶĂĚǀŝĐĞ ?ƌĞůĂƚŝǀĞƚŽƚŚĞĨŽƌĞĐĂƐƚĞƌ ?ƐŽǁŶũƵĚŐŵĞŶƚ ?ĂƌĞŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞĚďǇĂŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨĨĂĐƚŽƌƐ
that often do not lead to the best forecasting outcomes, implying that the combination of  
forecasts and advice should not be left to the discretion of individual forecasters. These two 
papers discuss their approaches in relation to others such as the Delphi technique. 
 
The analysis by Wilson (this issue [7]) suggests that dependencies  W in particular positive 
ones  W often occur between experts, probably due to shared knowledge and/or heuristic 
use (and thus experts may also have similar biases, such as overconfidence). Given these 
dependencies Wilson suggests that it is better to use Bayesian aggregation methods, which 
take them into account, than opiŶŝŽŶƉŽŽůŝŶŐŵĞƚŚŽĚƐ ?ƐƵĐŚĂƐŽŽŬĞ ?ƐŵĞƚŚŽĚ ?7, which do 
not. However, if sufficient seed-variable judgments are available for a number of experts 
then one could potentially measure between- and within-expert dependencies and match 
experts to aggregation measures accordingly (e.g. if there are strong within and weak 
ďĞƚǁĞĞŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶĐŝĞƐƚŚĞŶƵƐĞŽŽŬĞ ?ƐŵĞƚŚŽĚ, if the opposite pattern is found then use 
a Bayesian method). We suggest that an analysis of dependency could also be used to see if 
sufficient diversity of opinion exists amongst experts and, if not, then try to recruit more or 
generate diversity ƵƐŝŶŐƚŚĞƚĞĐŚŶŝƋƵĞƐůŝŬĞĞǀŝů ?ƐĂĚǀŽĐĂĐǇŵĞŶƚŝŽŶĞĚĂďŽǀĞ ? 
 
Stage 3: Application of Method 
 
This is where the method chosen in the previous stage is applied in order to anticipate the 
future. Since this is EKE, experts are central to any method that is applied, but expert 
involvement may either occur directly (e.g. expert judgement is used to extrapolate a time-
series, or adjust a statistical forecast) or indirectly (e.g. experts judge values for parameters 
in a statistical model that is then used to make a forecast).  Following from this it should be 
clear that an initial step in applying an EKE method must be finding quality expertise. 
 
a). Screening and training experts 
 
The goal of EKE is to reach a final set of judgments  W in the current context, judgments 
regarding the future state of the world  W ƚŚĂƚĂƌĞĂƐĐůŽƐĞƚŽƚŚĞŝƌĞǀĞŶƚƵĂů “ƌĞĂůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?ĂƐ
possible. Treating EKE as a piece of empirical research, one way to try and achieve this goal 
is, as with all empirical research, to collect as much data as possible: for EKE this means 
eliciting the knowledge of a large number of experts. However, it often takes many years of 
training and practice to reach the highest levels of skill and knowledge in a domain, so 
usually those with the highest expertise are in short supply. This leaves those wishing to 
conduct EKE with two basic strategies: sample a larger number of less skilled experts or 
                                                          
7 The authors suggest that too much positive dependency can lead to overconfident aggregated forecasts  W by 
opinion pooling  W because they overestimate unique information each expert brings to bear. 
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sample a smaller number of highly skilled experts, perhaps eliciting more knowledge and/or 
to a greater depth. 
 
The first strategy has been applied to anticipating the future, and ŵĂŬĞƐƵƐĞŽĨƚŚĞ “ǁŝƐĚŽŵ
ŽĨĐƌŽǁĚƐ ?ƉŚĞŶŽŵĞŶŽŶ ?ǁŚĞƌĞƚŚĞĂǀĞƌĂŐĞŽĨĂĐƌŽǁĚ ?ƐũƵĚŐŵĞŶƚŝƐĐůŽƐĞƚŽƚŚĞƚƌƵƚŚĚƵĞ
to averaging out the noise due to idiosyncracy in individual judgments (2004).  One example 
of this so-ĐĂůůĞĚ “crowdsourcing ? that has been used for forecasting is prediction markets. 
Here a great number of educated but non-expert people are involved and are paid on the 
basis of forecast accuracy. Prediction markets have been found to produce good forecasts in 
certain domains, such as prediction of geo-political events (Mellers et al., 2014). 
 
The second strategy  W in-depth elicitation with a few top experts  W is the most usual 
approach. This is partly due to the aforementioned scarcity of experts, but also due to 
practicalities of applying some of the methods. For instance, the Sheffield method and 
Scenario Planning require experts to be brought to a particular place at a particular time for 
a workshop8, and the larger the group the harder it is to facilitate the process effectively. 
For ŽŽŬĞ ?ƐŵĞƚŚŽĚ experts can be seen individually at different times and locations, but 
since it is preferred to interview each in person at some length, having large numbers of 
experts would be very time consuming. It has also been noted that there are diminishing 
returns to having more than about ten to twelve experts per group in ŽŽŬĞ ?ƐŵĞƚŚŽĚ, 
although a lower limit of around six is recommended (Aspinall, 2010; Cooke & Probst, 
2006).While the Delphi method can be applied remotely, with considerable flexibility 
regarding timing (e.g Gordon & Pease, 2006), it can be difficult to achieve consensus with 
large groups. Further, providing feedback after each round from and to numerous experts 
without overwhelming the participants can be laborious and difficult for the facilitator9.  
 
In the unusual situation where there are more experts who are willing to take part in the 
elicitation exercise than you need, those experts with the most, and most relevant, 
expertise could be put onto a short-list. Screening for the short-list might be accomplished 
by asking candidate experts to answer some questions designed to test either their 
substantive or normative expertise, or both. For example, the seed questions asked of 
experts in ŽŽŬĞ ?ƐŵĞƚŚŽĚ can be considered as tests of both domain knowledge (i.e. 
knowledge related to the anticipation problem) and meta-knowledge concerning the 
uncertainty surrounding judgments (i.e. how realistic their probability judgments are): both 
of these assessments are combined ƚŽƉƌŽĚƵĐĞƚŚĞǁĞŝŐŚƚŝŶŐĨŽƌĂŶĞǆƉĞƌƚ ?ƐŽƉŝŶŝŽŶ10. 
Often a threshold is set such that experts whose performance on the seed questions is 
below this level have their weights set to zero, meaning essentially that they are screened 
out of the EKE exercise. As an alternative to testing, potential experts can be asked to fill out 
a questionnaire regarding their normative and substantive expertise thus permitting both 
screening and assessment of training needs (see e.g. this issue [5] and Bolger & Wentholt ?Ɛ
(2014) expert-skills questionnaire). 
                                                          
8 As technology improves, bringing people physically together is becoming less of an issue, however, there are 
still technical (and temporal) constraints on the size of groups that can be managed. 
9 However, more experts can mean greater variation in opinion thus helping to reduce overconfidence: a 
compromise might be to induce variability into a smaller group. 
10 ,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ŽůŐĞƌĂŶĚZŽǁĞ ? ? ? ? ? ?ĂƌŐƵĞƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǁĞŝŐŚƚƐ ŶŽŽŬĞ ?ƐŵĞƚŚŽĚĨĂǀŽƵƌŶŽƌŵĂƚŝǀe abilities (i.e 
realism of probability judgment) over substantive (i.e. domain knowledge). 
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Training is most usually related to expression of uncertainty (i.e. normative rather than 
substantive aspect of expert judgment). Another approach is to give all experts normative 
training as part of induction. Training could also be given in substantive expertise, though. 
For example, if anticipation would benefit from expertise from several different specialisms, 
then some training, for instance in terminology and basic concepts, could be given across 
specialisms so as to assist communication (i.e. knowledge exchange between experts). Such 
training in substantive issues might most easily be accomplished face-to-face in a facilitated 
workshop, but could also conceivably be achieved online, for instance in a Delphi process.  
 
In Alvarado et al. (this issue [5]) the experts were sorted into relatively high and low 
expertise groups on basis of GEM (utilizing the knowledge sub-scale  W which had high 
reliability  W and overall GEM score, where high-scoring experts made more valid 
adjustments and forecasts than low). The authors comment that selection might be further 
improved if personality characteristics associated with good forecasting can be identified 
and a questionnaire tailored to specific domain knowledge requirements developed. The 
authors also suggest that there is room for training experts with outcome feedback and 
inducing healthy scepticism with regard to statistical forecasts. Meanwhile, Petropolous et 
al. (this issue [6]) explicitly focus on the issue of training experts (in substantive rather than 
normative aspects of the forecasting task). They provide outcome and performance 
feedback after each non-probabilistic judgmental-extrapolation forecast in an attempt to 
reduce documented biases. They conclude that training was successful in this respect, with 
feedback that revealed judgmental bias being particularly effective. 
 
Hanea et al. (this issue [3]) use a crowdsourcing approach: thus they used a large number of 
relatively inexpert judges rather than a few judges high in expertise. There was no initial 
screening but participants were evaluated in the first year and sorted and weighted on the 
basis of this for the second year. Although there was no formal training (e.g. in probability, 
since probability distributions were elicited), participants were given an initial briefing by e-
mail and/or phone regarding the ƐƚƵĚǇ ?ƐƉƵƌƉŽƐĞ ?ƋƵĞƐƚŝon format, and possible biases: this 
included some example practice questions. 
 
b). Application of method  
 
As mentioned at the outset, anticipation involves applying a model to data to produce a 
prediction:  the method determines how the model is applied to data and/or it produces 
data that can then become input to a model (e.g. probabilities and values of other 
parameters). 
 
Research into judgmental forecasting has thrown up a number of psychological biases 
affecting forecast performance, however, it speaks little to what should be done about them 
to improve the use of judgment in foresight exercises (see e.g. Lawrence et al., 2006). In 
contrast, a central concern of EKE is how to elicit judgments from experts that are free 
from bias. These biases may arise from the way that data and models are presented to 
experts (so-ĐĂůůĞĚ “ĨƌĂŵŝŶŐĞĨĨĞĐƚƐ ?ƐĞĞ ?e.g. Kahneman & Tversky, 1984 ), from the use of 
heuristics by individual experts (e.g. anchoring and adjustment, availability, and 
representativeness), or from the social dynamics of groups (e.g. Groupthink, risky shift, and 
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influence by dominant individuals), or any combination of the three. To this end EKE 
protocols are specifically designed to minimize such problems. For instance, the Sheffield 
protocol provides an ordering for eliciting estimates that reduces anchoring effects, ŽŽŬĞ ?Ɛ
method uses a scoring rule designed to encourage the expression of true beliefs and thus 
reduces the tendency towards overconfidence, and the Delphi ŵĞƚŚŽĚ ?ƐůĂĐŬŽĨĚŝƌĞĐƚ
interaction minimizes social biases (see e.g., Bolger et al., 2014).  
 
As we have already indicated, how best to elicit uncertainty is of particular interest in EKE. 
One issue of concern here is a tension between how experts usually express uncertainty and 
how we would ideally wish them to, from the viewpoint of modelling uncertainty for use in 
foresight exercises. Many experts are reluctant to quantify their uncertainty, preferring 
ŝŶƐƚĞĂĚƚŽƵƐĞŶĂƚƵƌĂůůĂŶŐƵĂŐĞƚĞƌŵƐƐƵĐŚĂƐ “ŚŝŐŚůǇƉƌŽďĂďůĞ ? ? “ůŝƚƚůĞĐŚĂŶĐĞ ?ĂŶĚ “ƋƵŝƚĞ
ůŝŬĞůǇ ? ?hŶĨŽƌƚƵŶĂƚĞůǇƚŚĞƐĞƚĞƌŵƐĂƌĞŶŽt used consistently even by a single expert on 
different occasions, so mapping the verbal terms onto numeric probabilities required as 
inputs to particular methods is problematic (see e.g., Dhami & Wallsten, 2005; Wallsten and 
Budescu, 1995).  
 
Even if numeric probabilities are elicited they can take different forms. If the occurrence of 
an event is being predicted then likelihood might be given as a percentage between 50 to 
100, where 50% means the expert thinks that the event is as likely to occur as not and 100% 
means the expert is sure it will happen. If uncertain quantities are being judged then the 
simplest method is for experts to be asked to give an interval around their best estimate 
within which the true value will fall with a given probability (e.g. 90%). Proponents of the 
Cooke and Sheffield methods prefer to go farther than simply eliciting a single interval, 
instead they ask for further intervals of different probabilities so that they can build up 
ĞǆƉĞƌƚƐ ?probability distributions for each uncertain quantity (see this issue [3] and [7], and 
Bolger et al., 2014). 
 
Overconfidence is a persistent bias found in both event probability judgments and interval 
judgments, including distributions (e.g. Glaser et al., 2013 ; Lichtenstein et al., 1980; Lin & 
Bier, 2008 ) The extent of bias depends to some extent on the way that probabilities are 
elicited. For example, overconfidence has been found to be less for smaller probability 
intervals (e.g. 75%) than bigger (e.g. 95%), or when experts are free to choose their own 
intervals (e.g., Teigen & Jorgensen, 2005). EKE is therefore concerned with how best to 
minimize overconfidence bias in expert probability assessment. 
 
The generation of accurate probability judgments may be an individual trait. An assumption 
ŽĨŽŽŬĞ ?ƐŵĞƚŚŽĚŝƐƚŚĂƚƐŽŵĞĞǆƉĞƌƚƐĂƌĞďĞƚƚĞƌƚŚĂŶŽƚŚĞƌƐ with regard to the realism of 
their judgments: measures of this ability on the seed variables are then used to weight 
experts for aggregation of judgments regarding the target variable. But there is little 
evidence for stability of probability-assessment skill over time or task (see e.g. Bolger & 
Rowe, 2015b) although Tetlock and others (Mellers et al., 2015; Tetlock & Gardner, 2015) 
found some geo-political forecasters seemed to consistently outperform others. 
Interestingly, these individuals were laypeople with no formally-acquired designation of 
differential expertise. 
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Domain of expertise may also influence the ability to assess probability. For instance, horse 
bettors, bridge players, and weather forecasters have been found to be quite realistic in 
their probability assessments (Hoerl & Fallin, 1974; Keren, 1987; Murphy & Brown, 1985). 
Bolger & Wright (1994) attribute this to the fact that experts in these domains have rapid 
feedback about their performance (i.e. learnability is high) and also have regular experience 
at expressing their uncertainty in a formal manner (i.e. ecological validity is high). More 
commonly, though, feedback will be much delayed or essentially unusable for probability 
assessment (e.g. each event is unique, or policies affect outcomes): we argue that 
probability judgment is unlikely to be reliable in such cases. 
 
On the topic of feedback, another concern in EKE is what feedback to provide to experts 
during elicitation. In the Delphi method, feedback of assessments is central to the process of 
 “ǀŝƌƚƵŽƵƐŽƉŝŶŝŽŶĐŚĂŶŐĞ ? ?ŽůŐĞƌĂŶĚtƌŝŐŚƚ ?2011) whereby quality of judgment improves 
over rounds: the richer the feedback the better, so feedback of rationales for judgment is 
encouraged. In the Sheffield method and Scenario Planning, feedback from other experts 
and the facilitator can be instantaneous due to the face-to-face nature of these methods. In 
ŽŽŬĞ ?ƐŵĞƚŚŽĚprovision of feedback after an elicitation exercise is recommended but not 
an integral part of the process (see Bolger & Rowe, 2014b). 
 
Uncertainty is elicited in some of the Special Issue papers. For example, in Meissner et al 
(this issue [1]) experts first generated factors impacting on the future development of the 
organization, then rated the degree of impact and the uncertainty of this impact on 10-point 
scales. Hanea et al (this issue [3]) elicit uncertainty regarding future events in an order 
designed to reduce bias (first, lowest probability; second, highest probability; and third best 
probability). Wilson (this issue [7]) makes use of the Delft database of studies utilizing 
ŽŽŬĞ ?ƐŵĞƚŚŽĚǁŚŝĐŚĞůŝĐŝƚƐƉƌŽďĂďŝůŝƚǇĚŝƐƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶƐŵŽƐƚĐŽŵŵŽŶůǇƵƐŝŶŐƚŚƌĞĞƋƵĂŶƚŝůĞƐ
(the 5th, 50th and 95th ? ?ŽŽŬĞ ?ƐŵĞƚŚŽĚĂƚƚĞŵƉƚƐƚŽĚĞďŝĂƐprobability estimates in two 
ways: first it uses Ă “ƉƌŽƉĞƌƐĐŽƌŝŶŐƌƵůĞ ?(see e.g. Brier, 1950) to ensure that judges provide 
estimates that truly reflect their beliefs; and second it weights experts ?ƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĂŶĐĞŽŶ
seed-variable evaluations  so that the best calibrated (most realistic and, potentially, least 
biased) get the most weight. However, Bolger and Rowe (2014a) question the effectiveness 
of both these strategies. How ƐŚŽƵůĚƐƵŝƚĂďůĞ “ƐĞĞĚƉƌŽďůĞŵƐ ?ďĞŝĚĞŶƚŝĨŝĞĚ ?dŚĞǇŚĂǀĞƚŽ
be similar to the substantive problem in some way but how should this similarity be 
measured?  Further, as we have already noted, Wilson suggests that the choice of 
aggregation method itself has implications for de-biasing, with choice of a Bayesian method 
potentially producing less overconfidence than opinion-ƉŽŽůŝŶŐŵĞƚŚŽĚƐƐƵĐŚĂƐŽŽŬĞ ?Ɛ ? 
 
Although other papers in the Special Issue do not elicit uncertainty, they all speak to the 
issue of de-biasing. For example, Alvarado et al. (this issue [5]) describe the de-biasing 
effects of 50-50 and divide-and-conquer (in particular to reduce effects of anchoring and 
adjustment) but comment that they did not compensate for the restricted information 
relative to judgmental adjustment. Further, the authors comment that it should be possible 
to combine judgmental adjustment with Delphi to harness the insights of the group without 
increasing bias. Onkal et al. (this issue  ? ? ? ?ŝĚĞŶƚŝĨǇĂ “ƚƌƵƚŚďŝĂƐ ? ?ǁŚĞƌĞďǇĨŽƌĞĐĂƐƚĞƌƐƉůĂĐĞ
too much faith in the veracity of advice, which leads to over-adjustment. They also find that 
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informal weighting which is suboptimal being subject to biasing influences such as the status 
of the advisor. Onkal et al. suggest concealing status by means of anonymous advisors and 
similarly restricting other indicators of the veracity of advice to those that reliably indicate 
its quality. Finally, Petropoulous et al. (this issue [6]) show that the provision of performance 
feedback, especially that which highlights bias on the part of forecasters, is effective for 
debiasing, at least in those situations where feedback is readily available (i.e. short-to-
medium-term forecasting). 
 
Stage 4: Evaluation and documentation 
 
Although this is offered here as the final stage, in some cases, particularly for rolling 
foresight projects and/or short- to medium-term forecasts, evaluation and documentation 
might be conducted at intermediate intervals in order to fine-tune the process. 
 
a). Evaluation of performance  
 
Performance should be evaluated wherever possible (i.e. in any case other than very long-
term horizons) and the results fed-back to relevant personnel (e.g. managers, participating 
experts) in order to try and improve the quality of prediction in future. The reliability and 
validity of individual input judgments and uncertainty assessments should also be evaluated 
and fed-back as appropriate. 
 
There is an issue as to how best to evaluate performance. If judgments are quantitative in 
nature, similar to each other (i.e. are based on essentially the same kind of information), are 
made by the same experts several times, and the outcomes are available within a useable 
time-frame for the organization, then error measures of the judgments such as mean 
squared error (for judgments of quantities) or Brier score (for probability judgments) are 
appropriate for both evaluation and feedback, and for use in training. However, as we have 
already mentioned ĂďŽǀĞŝŶƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƚŽŽŽŬĞ ?ƐŵĞƚŚŽĚ, caution should be exercised in 
using such performance measures to select or weight experts; at least until further research 
has demonstrated that such procedures provide practically significant advantages over 
equal treatment of experts (Bolger & Rowe, 2015 a, b). If not all of these conditions pertain, 
then the reliability and validity of these performance measures can be questioned, and 
coherence measures might be better used (e.g. consistency with axioms of logic and 
probability). For qualitative judgments subjective assessment of validity and coherence is all 
that is really possible. 
 
In Meissner et al. (this issue [1]) judgments of uncertainty and impact by internal and 
external stakeholders are compared but not formally (e.g. statistically) evaluated. However, 
descriptive (graphical) summaries of results for impact and uncertainty are fed-back to 
experts, discussed, and potentially influence subsequent decision making. In Scenario 
Planning, as described by Derbyshire and Wright (this issue [2]), strategy can be tested 
against scenarios generated by experts through simulation and thought experiment. 
However, given long horizons, and awareness that the process itself influences the 
outcomes (since actions may be taken by workshop participants to both facilitate the 
occurrence of favorable futures and to avoid unfavorable ones), more formal evaluation is 
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difficult-to-impossible. Hanea et al. (this issue [3]) evaluate probabilistic forecasts for binary 
events using the Brier score (which they criticize). Further, within / ?Ɛ Delphi-like 
structure, judgments and rationales are fed back to judges (but not performance, as this can 
only be assessed after forecast events occur). In Onkal et al. (this issue [4]) realizations of 
forecasts are given as feedback to evaluate advice (but no rationales).  In Alvarado et al. 
(this issue [5]) forecast error is computed as average percent error but no outcome or 
performance feedback is given to experts in the study (although the authors make a 
recommendation to provide this as training in real applications). Further,  Petroplous et al. 
(this issue [6]) find that such feedback is useful for debiasing, particularly when given after 
each forecast rather than averaged over several. Finally, Wilson (this issue [7]) measures 
performance (on seed variables) using error scores like MAPE, but does not discuss 
providing such measures as feedback (e.g. for training) or the potential effects of doing this 
on dependencies and aggregation: this is something that may warrant future research 
attention. 
 
b). Documentation of Process  
 
In addition to reporting on the quality of the forecasts (and inputs) the entire forecasting 
process should be documented as fully as possible in order to again improve the outcomes 
both locally (i.e. for the organization commissioning the forecasts). and for the wider 
community. If forecasts are to be used for policy making then documentation is essential to 
maintain transparency and create a consultable audit trail. In addition, provision of feedback 
and documentation to experts is important to reward participation, and retain expert 
participation in future exercises (or ongoing exercises). These issues are not explicitly 
addressed in any of the papers in the Special Issue so we will not discuss them beyond 
noting that documentation is an important part of the EKE process, particularly in practical 
settings. 
 
Discussion 
 
As a piece of applied research, with many characteristics of a methodology, EKE is to be 
contrasted with most previous work concerned with the role of judgment in forecasting, 
which has largely been basic research investigating how judgment compares to statistical 
forecasting under various conditions  W ŵŽƐƚůǇĨŽĐƵƐƐŝŶŐŽŶƚŚĞ “ĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨŵĞƚŚŽĚ ?
stage in the forecasting process  W with rather limited practical recommendations arising 
(see, e.g., Lawrence et al., 2006, for a review). Conversely, EKE as we have defined it above, 
rather than in its narrow interpretation in relation to risk analysis, has much in common 
with Scenario Planning, in that it is a practical enterprise, concerned with the entire process 
of eliciting and modelling expert knowledge: for this reason we have regarded Scenario 
Planning as another kind of EKE in this editorial and Special Issue.  
 
Similarities and differences between EKE, judgmental forecasting research (henceforth JF), 
and Scenario Planning are shown in Table 1. Note that the analysis in this table is something 
of an over-simplification, for instance, sometimes experiments are used in EKE, and real 
experts studied in JF, but we maintain that the characterizations in the table are the most 
typical.  Nevertheless, we note that recent  examples to the contrary are now emerging  W 
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ƐĞĞ&ŝůĚĞƐĞƚĂů ?Ɛ ? ? ? ? ? ?ĨŝĞůĚƐƚƵĚǇĂŶĚƚŚĞƐƚƵĚŝĞƐďǇ&ƌĂŶƐĞƐet al (e.g., 2011) on both 
macro-economic and company forecasts. Despite the differences between the JF approach 
and the EKE approach there is also much overlap, and the papers in this Special Issue that 
come from a judgmental forecasting tradition (this issue [4],[5] and [6]) provide valuable 
insight into particular issues that we have discussed above as being important to EKE such 
as: the selection, weighting and training of experts; the choice of method on the basis of 
features of tasks and experts; and the evaluation of performance and its use as feedback. 
 
Table 1: Typical focus of the three approaches  
 Expert Knowledge 
Elicitation 
Judgmental 
Forecasting 
Scenario Planning 
Participants Groups of 
professionals/experts 
Individual 
laypeople/novices 
Groups of 
professionals/experts 
Methodology Case-based Experimental Case-based 
Focus Whole process Specific stage Whole process 
Rationale Applied: Inform 
strategy/decision 
making 
Pure: Test 
hypothesis or 
answer specific 
research question 
Applied: Inform 
strategy/decision 
making 
Models Causal-explicit or 
Statistical/deterministic 
Causal-implicit* or 
Statistical 
Causal-explicit 
Usual Time Horizon Medium-Long Short-Medium Long 
*e.g. judgmental extrapolation or adjustment without underlying models being made 
explicit 
 
 Perhaps the biggest issue with EKE is assessing its effectiveness. This is partly because the 
extant studies are case-based and do not obviously generalize. Also, the in-practice use of 
medium to long time-horizons precludes outcome validation. Further, as Green and 
Armstrong (2015) argue, simpler forecasting methods tend to be more effective than more 
complex, and the EKE procedures described in the papers in this Special Issue are relatively 
complex. Although, as we have stressed above, EKE is usually applied when simpler methods 
are inadequate, nonetheless further research is needed in order to evaluate whether the 
additional resources needed for EKE are worth it. Scenario planning is not a forecasting 
method, however, similar issues regarding effectiveness are inherent in its use.   
 
Since many of the readers of this Special Issue will be familiar with JF but not EKE we think it 
is worth exploring the similarities and differences between the two approaches further in 
ƚŚĞĨŽƌŵŽĨĂƐŚŽƌƚ “YĂŶĚ ? that follows next. 
  
Q1) Expert judgment has been studied in the JF literature for many years: just what does 
the new EKE conceptualisation add to this? 
 
As we can see from Table 1 there are several differences between the two approaches.  
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In EKE the expert is crucial whereas in JF it is just another variable that is manipulated in 
some studies, many JF research studies making use of non-professionals (e.g. students) or 
novices. This focus on the expert means that characteristics of expertise (e.g. normative 
versus substantive characteristics) are measured and analyzed in detail in EKE but are often 
ignored or not treated in detail in JF. Further, JF usually examines individual judgment 
whereas mostly EKE elicits the judgments of several experts, thus raising the issue of how 
best to combine the judgments that is rarely addressed in JF research, beyond how to 
integrate the judgment of one person with statistical output, or combine the judgments of 
an advisor and advisee. 
 
Another difference between EKE and JF is that the former is concerned with the whole 
process, whereas the latter generally focuses on specific stages of the process. This means 
that the focus on experts in EKE feeds into several aspects of the process such as selection, 
screening, and training, as well as having implications for the choice of method, type of 
aggregation and weighting. 
 
The different methodologies typically used by the two approaches  W case-based versus 
experimental: the former with explicit applied goals, the latter focused more on theory 
testing  W also has implications for the theoretical and applied contributions of this research. 
On the plus side for JF the greater internal validity offered by the experimental approach 
means that the factors that influence the quality of anticipation involving judgment can be 
isolated and examined in detail, thus permitting improvement in foresight methods on the 
one hand, and testing of (social) psychological theories, on the other. On the plus side for 
EKE the case-based approach has greater ecological validity than the experimental one, and 
generally produces richer data (e.g. in the form of protocols or causal models). However, 
both approaches have their downsides, with the applicability of JF findings to real-world 
problems often being in question, while it can be difficult to generalize lessons of EKE 
research to different task domains. We plead wider use of experimental methods to 
investigate expert judgment for anticipation, but with true experts performing real, or 
realistic, tasks. This is may not appear easy, since it is practically difficult to perform 
experiments with experts (by definition they are busy and scarce) but, in fact, most people 
are expert at something (or can be trained to be11). 
 
Two other differences between EKE and JF intersect with the methodological concerns we 
discuss in the previous paragraph: the models and the anticipation horizon. EKE tends to 
elicit or integrate expert knowledge into rich, often causal, models, then use those for long-
term anticipation, whereas JF usually does not make explicit the causal knowledge of the 
judges (or characterizes them in rather simple terms e.g. as heuristics); as is the case for 
judgmental extrapolation and for judgmental adjustment of statistical output, for short- to 
medium-term forecasting. 
 
                                                          
11 For example student participants could be trained to make diagnoses on the basis of cues within an 
experimental session thus accelerating a learning process that might otherwise take years. 
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Q2) You describe developments and advances in EKE that have been made within the field of 
risk estimation: does this mean that some areas of EKE have been under-studied in the 
forecasting literature? If so, what should be the new topics of research focus in judgmental 
forecasting? 
 
This question has been partially answered in the previous section. JF would benefit from 
more frequently studying real experts performing on tasks that are clearly related to their 
expertise (and are framed in a familiar way with regard both to presentation of data and 
mode of response): this would entail more in-depth analysis of both tasks and the 
capabilities of the experts. Also it would be good to see more work in JF on the 
characteristics of expert knowledge (e.g. mapping it and measuring its coherence, reliability 
over time, generalizability etc.).  Further, there is a need for more studies of forecasting in 
groups (nominal or real) and how best to elicit and combine group knowledge and forecasts.  
 
Both from an EKE and a JF perspective, problem detection and the elicitation and 
construction of expert domain models have received relatively little attention: both could be 
informed by work in Scenario Planning in these areas. Documentation of the process has 
also received relatively little attention, particularly from JF. 
 
Q3) You have introduced several new approaches such as expert selection, IDEA, IL, GEM, 
and Sheffield ĂŶĚŽŽŬĞ ?Ɛ methods. What are the take-home implications for the practical 
improvement of judgmental forecasting practice? 
  
The main message is that expert judgment should be considered as data and, as such, the 
methods used to obtain and use this data (i.e. EKE) should be such that they maximize the 
reliability and validity of this data (as is true of any empirical method). There are a number 
of different ways of achieving reliability and validity of expert judgment, which are mostly 
not mutually exclusive, and thus can be combined: 
- measuring the normative and substantive expertise of potential experts through 
tests (e.g. of answers to seed questions), self-assessment questionnaires (e.g. 
answers to the expert-skills questionnaire), assessment by others (e.g. answers to 
GEM), experience indicators (e.g. CV: years in role, qualifications, publications, 
citations, patents etc.), and social indicators (e.g. job title, media presence etc.); 
- using such measures of expertise to select, screen or weight experts; 
- using such measures to identify training needs and train accordingly; 
- removing noise by careful use of well-researched elicitation protocols that include 
the use of: proper scoring rules, rich feedback of judgments, and opportunities to 
reflect on judgments and revise them; 
- also using well-researched and administered protocols that avoid effects of 
framing, availability, representativeness and anchoring to debias individual 
judgments, and that also provide both anonymity and facilitated information 
exchange to de-bias group judgments; 
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- collecting as much data as is possible while balancing costs and benefits of 
increasing sample size (noting that there may be a trade-off between sample size 
and degree of participant expertise). 
 
In summary, focus on the above will underpin the development of Ă “ŵĞƚĂ-ƉƌŽƚŽĐŽů ?
guiding the whole process of EKE to aid anticipation of the future: from problem recognition 
through to documentation. 
 
Finally, our discussion and analysis here is not comprehensive: some important aspects of 
the EKE process have not been addressed (or are not addressed very thoroughly) as they are 
not discussed explicitly in any of the papers in the Special Issue These include: motivation 
and incentives; decomposition (and re-composition of judgment); reliability and validity of 
data/expert judgment; anonymity; transparency of the process; and ethical issues. These 
are also possible subjects for future research  W the initial and final stages (i.e. initiation and 
documentation) are also areas which, we believe, will particularly benefit from focussed 
work. 
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